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Abstract
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engage in R&D in order to make an uncertain innovation. The ini-
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agreement will always dominate the go-it-alone solution; we use the
analysis to delineate situations in which cooperation should involve
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1 Introduction
The existing stock of knowledge in an industry - measured in terms of patents
for instance - may be asymmetrically spread between rms. Building upon
existing knowledge through fresh Research and Development (R&D) is im-
portant both for process and product innovation, and generally for economic
growth. In this paper, we consider the e¤ects that the initial distribution of
knowledge has on rmsincentives to undertake new R&D activity, and we
look at the consequences of various types of knowledge sharing strategies.
An inuential branch of the R&D literature, starting with the seminal paper
by dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988), looks at knowledge transfer as an
unintended by-product of the R&D process, a spillover between rms. Later
work by among others Katsoulacos & Ulph (1998), Kultti & Takalo (1998)
and Poyago-Theotoky (1999) has endogenized the size of the spillover so that
knowledge transfer - to the extent that this is optimal - becomes a conscious
decision of the rms. An alternative formulation of the spillover makes it
dependent upon the type of cooperative agreement that the rms enter into
(Kamien, Muller & Zang, 1992). Common to all of these models is an un-
derlying production game in which R&D has a deterministic e¤ect on the
marginal cost of production; the marginal cost in itself is implicitly assumed
to embody all previous technological progress. Since rms are usually taken
to be symmetric at the outset, one can interpret this as an even spread of
existing knowledge.
However, acquiring knowledge has become a conscious part of rmsstrat-
egy, and markets for this knowledge have arisen in many industries (see Arora
et al, 2001). Indeed, Cohen et al (2002) have identied several reasons that
rms acquire and patent knowledge, and one of these is to use as a bargain-
ing chip in cross licensing agreements or other forms of technology access.
This is echoed by Rivette and Klein (2000; 6) who state that "Owning in-
tellectual property lets companies develop very favourable partnerships and
licensing relationships". Hence, one cannot take as given an even distribution
of prior knowledge. In cumulative innovation, one can consider that existing
knowledge must be built upon to achieve an overall goal. Some rms may be
closer to the goal than others at any point in time. We consider rms that
may have initially di¤erent stocks of knowledge, but that must add to this
to increase the chances of making an innovation. In biotechnology for exam-
ple, there are di¤erent general platform tools that are developed upstream
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for the testing of the action of molecules, drug design and the production of
gene-chips downstream (Arora et al, 2001; 160-161). Access to this tech-
nology is a prerequisite for being able to compete in the downstream R&D
market. While some rms have specialized themselves as providers of these
platform tools, there is evidence that some rms are active both upstream
and downstream.1 Given the initial stock of knowledge and its distribution,
what factors might a¤ect the decisions of rms to exchange this knowledge,
and how does this a¤ect the extent of ongoing R&D? These are fundamental
questions that we address in this paper.
Suppose that an innovation is cumulative so that it combines already ex-
isting knowledge with new R&D. Several rm strategies for the exchange of
information can be identied here, depending upon whether they exchange
existing knowledge only, future results of R&D only, or a combination of
both.2 All of these information sharing strategies can be compared to a
go-it-alone benchmark in which there is no cooperation. When only prior
knowledge is exchanged, one can aliken this to a reciprocal cross-licensing of
existing patents, and when only new information is shared this would corre-
spond to a forward-looking Technology Sharing Cartel (TSC).3 The case in
which existing and future knowledge are shared among rms can be alikened
to a patent pool.4 In our model, innovation is uncertain but is increasing in
the level of knowledge of each rm. Discoveries are not necessarily exclusive,
and rms can innovate a viable product that makes them compete in the post
R&D market.5 In the analysis, we show that some form of cooperative agree-
ment can always increase industry prot compared to the go-it-alone solution.
Reciprocal cross-licensing of existing information is always dominated by an
TSC or patent pool. Which of the TSC and patent pool maximizes industry
returns is shown in the analysis to depend upon the degree of competition
in the post R&D market and the degree of asymmetry in the distribution of
the initial stock of knowledge.
1See Joly & de Looze (1996) for the case of plant biotechnology.
2In the analysis, we focus on reciprocal exchange of di¤erent types of information and
the e¤ects that this has on R&D. We abstract from any royalty payments or licensing fees.
3See Petit and Tolwinsky (1999).
4There are many types of patent pools and some of these involve licensing all patents
to a third party that then arranges production. Here we assume that the research rms
can benet from the innovation directly.
5One could imagine di¤erent biomedicines that are similar in design and e¤ect for
example, but distinct enough to be considered di¤erent products.
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Our model of knowledge creation and transfer has also an alternative
interpretation. The existing stock of knowledge may be thought of as basic
research that has been at least partly funded by public authorities, and R&D
carried out by rms is then applied research aimed at developing commer-
cializable products. The distribution of the initial stock of knowledge can
then be interpreted as reecting public policy towards the nancing of basic
research. At the two extremes, one can imagine a policy of "picking winners"
in which all funding is directed towards a single rm, and a neutral policy
in which the funds for basic research are spread evenly between rms. Our
analysis then looks at the implications of these policies for add-on R&D and
the knowledge-sharing strategies of rms.
The e¤ect of existing knowledge on future R&D and cooperative strate-
gies is of particular relevance for nascent industries such as those built on
nanotechnology. Bawa (2005) discusses the "patent land-grab" that is oc-
curring in nanomedicine in which rms are aggressively ling broad patent
claims relating to the ve basic nanomaterials in the hope of creating toll
booths for future development and commercialization of products based on
these. Our analysis highlights conditions under which rms in an industry
can benet from untangling and sharing their intellectual property.
The paper is organized in 9 Sections. Following this introduction, the
general model is outlined in Section 2. Four di¤erent cases, non-cooperation
and three cooperative arrangements, are presented in Section 3, 4, 5 and 6.
The incentives for cooperation are discussed in Section 7 and 8, and Section
9 concludes.
2 The general model
There are two risk-neutral rms, indexed by i = 1; 2, who compete to make an
innovation. In order to be successful, the level of knowledge that a rm must
possess must be above some threshold level which is determined stochastically
by independent draws from a uniform probability function dened on the
interval [0,1]. Each rm begins the game with an amount of knowledge 1 >
i  0, and can add to this through two channels: knowledge trading or
knowledge production. The latter involves independent investments in R&D
where the amount of extra knowledge created by rm i is given by xi at




. We open up for the possibility that the production of new
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knowledge may spill over from one rm to another.6 Given the rmsinitial
level of knowledge (however acquired), each has the option of investing in
R&D to add to this level; then they get an independent draw from the
probability distribution to determine whether they have been successful in
making the innovation. Success or failure is then publicly revealed, and the
rms compete in the product market at stage 2. Firm i earns a prot of
(1   a) if both rm i and j succeed, 1 if i succeeds and j fails (monopoly
prot is normalized to unity), and zero if i fails. The prots to rm j are
dened symmetrically. The parameter a is contained in the interval [1=2; 1)
depending on product market competition with one half corresponding to
collusion and as we approach unity the limit case of Bertrand competition
with identical products would emerge.7
Suppose that the stock of knowledge that rm i possesses initially is given
by i, whilst the amount of new knowledge created by this rm is identical
to its R&D level xi. Without loss of generality we shall assume that i  j.
We allow for the possibility that the rival rms knowledge and knowledge
creation can a¤ect the own probability of innovation by supposing that i
gets a share of js knowledge: xj + j. Here  and  take the values 0
or 1 to indicate which, if any, type of knowledge is transferred. We shall
use these parameters to delineate di¤erent cases in the analysis. Given
the structure of the model, the probability that rm i (i = 1; 2) succeeds





 xi + i + xj + j.
The expected net prots to rm i (i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j) at stage 2 is given by




Making the necessary substitutions, and rearranging gives
Ei =
 











6This is in line with the vast majority of the R&D literature in this eld such as
dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992). The rst
posits spillovers between R&D outputs (unit cost reductions) and the latter between R&D
inputs (R&D expenditures).
7The limit case of a = 1 is not consistent with an interior equilibrium, however. This
becomes apparent later in this section.
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The rst order condition for a maximum, and corresponding reaction
function is given by
@
@xi
Ei = 0() xi =
1  axj(1 + )  aj(1 + )  ai(+ )
1 + 2a
(3)
Here we are assuming an interior solution: obviously a rm will not con-
tinue with R&D beyond the point where xi + i + xj + j = 1 since this
activity would then entail a cost and no corresponding benet.8
R&D expenditures are strategic substitutes in this model since dxi(xj)=dxj <
0 from (3).
Solving the reaction functions of the rms simultaneously gives equilib-









where the denominator  > 0 by the stability condition (see Seade, 1980,
for a general analysis, and Henriques, 1990 for the application of the stability
condition to R&D games). The expressions for ;;
;  are
  (1 + 3a+ a) (1  a(1  ))
   a( a+ +  + a)

   a (1  a +  + a)
   1  a(1  )
The stability condition implies that a(1  ) < 1 , so   is positive and 

is negative. Hence, equilibrium R&D level falls with the rivals level of prior
knowledge. When no knowledge is exchanged,  is positive, else negative.
Hence, equilibrium R&D level falls (increases) with own level of prior knowl-
edge when (no) knowledge is exchanged When  = 1 or  = 1 then  = 

and the solution of the R&D problem will be symmetric. This implies that
we will get a symmetric solution for the R&D level if prior knowledge only is
exchanged ( = 1), or if both types of knowledge are exchanged ( =  = 1).
The actual R&D levels will vary between these cases, however, and we return
to this below. First, we analyze a benchmark case in which no knowledge
transfer occurs (i.e. a fully non-cooperative solution).
8Existence conditions for the equilibria are taken up below.
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3 Benchmark non-cooperative case
When the rms do not exchange knowledge of any sort we have that  =
 = 0. Inserting in (4), we obtain the go alone or benchmark solution
xBi =




(1  a) (1 + a) (5)
where the "B" superscript refers to the benchmark case. To facilitate
comparison with the other cases that we consider in the paper, it is convenient
to write i  b and j  (1   b) with   i + j and b 2 [1=2; 1] where
b = 1=2 means i = j; and b = 1 means i =  and j = 0. Since b  12
we are assuming that i is always at least as knowledgeable at the outset as j
(and this is without loss of generality). Hence the parameter  captures the
aggregate level of pre-R&D knowledge, and b its distribution between rms.
Inserting into (5) gives
xBi =
(1  a) + a (ba  (1  b))
(1  a) (1 + a) (6)
xBj =
(1  a) + a((1  b)a  b))
(1  a) (1 + a) (7)
The interior solution in (5) is valid as long as xBi  0, the stability
condition is fullled, and the requirement that the probability of innovation is
at most 1. This latter condition, limiting the amount of asymmetry between
the rms, can be written as:
b  (1  a)a+ a
(1 + a)
 b
Indeed b  b also guarantees that R&D levels are positive, and it is
straightforward to verify that the most knowledgeable rm at the outset will
have the largest R&D and the largest chance of innovating. Observe that the
feasible asymmetry that is consistent with an interior equilibrium depends on
the level of competition and the level of aggregate prior knowledge. For max-
imum competition (a approaching 1) any substantial degree of asymmetry is
precluded since b approaches 1=2. If competition is softer any asymmetry is
permissible provided aggregate prior knowledge is small enough.
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Note that the sum of R&D in the benchmark case is independent of the
distribution of  since
XB  xBi + xBj =
2  a
1 + a
For this to be an equilibrium requires also that the expected prot be










j + 2(1  b))
2
(9)
so that EBi ; E
B
j  0 as long as the R&D levels are non-negative. It
is easily veried that EBi  EBj for b  12with equality for like prior
knowledge (b = 1
2
).
The relative properties of this benchmark case are summed up in Propo-
sition 1, where we have written the probability of innovation for each rm
simply as FBi and F
B
j .







Some comparative static properties of the interior equilibrium are straight-
forward to verify. The more biased the initial distribution of knowledge is












In aggregate, an increase in  will lead to a fall in R&D: @X
B
@
< 0. The e¤ect
that an increase in the aggregate level of knowledge will have on R&D at the



















When there is little di¤erence between the rms initially (small b) then
initial knowledge substitutes for new R&D for both rms; for a su¢ ciently
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large di¤erence, the leader will increase its R&D in response to an increase in
the initial level of aggregate knowledge. Comparative static results relating













0. The less evenly distributed initial knowledge is, the better (worse) is this
for the expected payo¤ of the leader (laggard). Whenever an increase in




















< 0 for low
enough b. The e¤ect that  has on EBi works through several channels; an
increase in this parameter increases the probability that i will successfully
innovate for any given knowledge distribution and R&D expenditure; in some
cases (i.e. for large enough b) this will also increase xBi directly, increasing
R&D cost. This latter e¤ect is partly mitigated by the fact that an increase
in  will reduce xBj directly and is strategic response to this is to reduce
R&D, saving cost. The total e¤ect is positive. When b is small, however,
and increase in  will lead to less own R&D by i saving cost, and reducing
the probability of successful innovation. For j one nds that when the rms
are fairly equal at the outset then
@EBj
@
> 0, whilst this result is reversed for
larger levels of inequality.
Although less elegant than (8) and (9), it is convenient for later com-
parisons to express average expected prot, EB, as a quadratic function of
,
EB  (EBi + EBj )=2 = AB2 +BB+BB (12)
where
AB 




2 (1 + a)2
> 0
We cannot in general sign AB so expected benchmark payo¤ may be a
concave or convex function of  depending on b and a, but observe that
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AB is increasing in b (hence at a minimum for b = 1=2), negative under
perfect symmetry (b = 1=2) and positive under complete asymmetry (b = 1)
regardless of degree of product market competition. We will return to this
expression in Section 8.
4 Transfer of prior knowledge - cross licens-
ing
We assume that the required parameter restrictions for equilibrium are ful-
lled and start out by looking at partial cooperation in the sense of transfer
of prior knowledge only. Writing   i+j, and inserting  = 0;  = 1 into




Note that the R&D level is independent of the distribution of prior knowl-
edge, and that prior knowledge is a substitute for new R&D. We see that
xP > 0 if 1=a >  which is always true since 1=a  1 >  so that knowledge
exchange can never preclude the production of new knowledge. In addition,
we require that the interior solution generates a probability of innovation
that does not exceed 1:
  a
For the equilibrium to be dened requires that each rm should earn a
non-negative prot in equilibrium. The expected prot of each rm can be
determined as:
EP  AP2 + 2BB+BB (13)
where
AP 
 a (2 + a)
2 (1 + a)2
< 0
Hence, the expected prot is a concave function of . One can easily verify
that (13) has one positive an one negative root and that the positive root
is equal to 1=a, ensuring positive prot. Also observe that expected prot
is a maximum for  = 2=(a(2 + a)). The next proposition states necessary
10
conditions for existence of this equilibrium; here we have written F P for the
common probability of success in equilibrium
Proposition 2 EP  0 and xP > 0 and F P  1 for   a.
The next proposition compares the amount of R&D that arises in equi-
librium in the two scenarios that we have considered up to now.
Proposition 3 (i) If b  b > 1
1+a
then xBi > x








> b  1
2
then xP < xBi and x
P < xBj .
In case (i) rm i is su¢ ciently advantaged compared to j.9 Here, the more
(less) knowledgeable rm will undertake less (more) R&D after exchanging
information compared to the benchmark case. When rms are more similar
as in (ii) knowledge exchange acts as a substitute for new R&D. One sees
immediately that the aggregate amount of R&D decreases after knowledge
exchange in case (ii). For case (i), it is easily veried that aggregate R&D
falls after knowledge exchange, so that the increase by the inferior rm at the
outset does not counter the fall in R&D activity of the initial leader. Recall
that a is the premium to being the only rm in the product market; as this
parameter increases, we are most likely to be in case (i) for a given b.
Proposition 4 indicates the e¤ect that the exchange of prior knowledge
has on the probability of innovation.
Proposition 4 (i) If b  b > 1
1+a
then FBi > F
P > FBj (ii) If
1
1+a
> b  1
2
then F P > FBi  FBj .
In case (i) the most advanced rm increases its probability of innovation
whilst the least advanced rm has a lower chance of innovation than in the
benchmark case. Although this rm absorbs the knowledge of the rival, it is
outweighed by its reduction in R&D in terms of the e¤ect on the probability
of innovation. Propositions 3(ii) and 4(ii) indicate that even though similar
rms will reduce their own R&D e¤ort after knowledge exchange, the net
e¤ect on the innovation probability is positive.
9The existence condition in Proposition 2 guarantees that there are feasible b that fall
in this range, i.e. that b  11+a .
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5 Transfer of new knowledge - Technology
Sharing Cartel
Consider the case in which rms do not share their prior knowledge, but agree
to allow reciprocal access to new knowledge ( = 1,  = 0). The amount of





where  < 1
a
secures positive investment. The constraint on the innova-
tion probability gives a further restriction that the most advanced rm at
the outset must have Fi = b+2xN < 1. Hence positive investment and less





probability constraint is binding when b < a. Given that the initial level of
knowledge is not equalized in this case, the expected payo¤s of the rms will
be asymmetric. For the interior equilibrium to exist further requires that
the least advantaged rm has a non-negative prot. Analytically, this is a
di¢ cult condition to tie down concisely. However, the previous existence con-
ditions are also echoed here since the expected prot of j is always positive
for su¢ ciently low .
The average expected payo¤ in this case can be worked out as
EN = AN
2 +BN+ CN (15)
where
AN =












The sign of AN is negative for low values of a and b, becoming positive






. When b > eb then EN is convex and strictly increasing in
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, and is positive at  = 0. When b < eb then EN is concave in , positive
valued and increasing at  = 0. To check that EN > 0 for all permissible
parameter values, we can check what happens at  = 1
a
for b > a and at
 = 4a 1
b(1+4a) 2a for b < a. If the expected prot is positive here then it will
be positive for all smaller values of . We nd indeed that EN( = 1
a
) > 0
and that EN( = 4a 1
b(1+4a) 2a) > 0 for b > a, so that the average expected
prot is positive for all permissible parameter values.
6 Full transfer of knowledge - Patent pools
We now consider full transfer of both existing and new knowledge. In this




Again the level of R&D is only dependent upon aggregate prior knowledge
and not its distribution. We observe that xF > 0 if 1=(2a) >  so an
agreement on transfer of all knowledge may prevent any production of new
knowledge if the initial knowledge levels of the rms are too large or when
product market competition will be hard. The interior solution must generate
a probability of innovation that does not exceed 1:
  4a  1
This condition is fullled whenever there is production of new knowl-
edge since 4a   1  1=(2a). The expected payo¤ must be non-negative in
equilibrium and is determined as
EF = AF






Hence the expected prot in this equilibrium is concave in the gross prior
level of knowledge and again there will be a positive and a negative root.
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For positive levels of R&D the restriction imposed by non-negative payo¤
will not be binding. This can be seen by observing that the positive root
in this case must exceed the positive root when only prior information was
exchanged (equal to 1=a, exceeding the requirement for positive R&D, equal
to 1=(2a)). These results are summed up in the next proposition:
Proposition 5 EF  0 and xF > 0 and F F = + 2xF  1 for   1
2a
.
7 Comparing knowledge transfer
In order to evaluate the incentives for cooperation, at the very least we need
to look at aggregate expected prots. If the expected average benchmark
payo¤exceeds the cooperative expected payo¤, then a cooperative agreement
between the two rms will not be enforceable. In the opposite case, the
industry as a whole will expect to gain from cooperation so that some kind
of agreement to cooperate might be feasible. This agreement might entail
sidepayments if one rm loses and one gains relative to the benchmark. The
same comparison must be done among the di¤erent cooperative cases. The
relevant information for the di¤erent cases are summarized below.
Case Average expected prot Restrictions on prior knowledge
Benchmark EB  AB2 +BB+BB   a(1  a)=(b(1 + a)  a)
Prior EP  AP2 + 2BB+BB   a
New EN  AN2 +BN+ CN   (4a  1)=(b(1 + 4a)  2a)
and   1=a
Full EF  AF2 + 2BN+ CN   1=(2a)
Let us start by observing that expected prots in the case of transfer
of prior knowledge only given by equation (13), degenerates to benchmark
prots given by the trem CB when there is no prior knowledge. Expected
prots in case of full cooperation or exchange of new knowledge is then equal
to the term CN , and exchange of knowledge is therefore preferred to not
sharing since CN > CB. In other words, allowing spillovers constitutes a self-
enforcing equilibrium when there is no prior knowledge. This is consistent
with a decision to apply identical R&D approaches to facilitate spillovers as
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suggested by Wiethaus (2005), but not consistent with a decision to apply
idiosyncratic R&D approaches to prevent spillovers as suggested by Kamien
and Zang (2000). When there is prior knowledge that may be exchanged, the
picture is more complicated and we will shortly see that the results may be
consistent with rms limiting spillovers as well, although they will not wish
to prevent spillovers altogether.
We will rst compare the cooperative arrangements. Symmetry is the
striking feature of the cooperative equilibria. When the rmsknowledge
is totally compatible, or equivalently the spillover is perfect, the rms have
an identical R&D e¤ort even though they are di¤erent at the outset. This
phenomenon is independent of the type of knowledge - new or "old" - that
is exchanged. Consequently, the technological leader at the outset will also
have the greater chance of making the innovation after the R&D stage. In
this sense, one can say that participation in knowledge exchange will preserve
the initial competitive edge of the leader.
Comparing full cooperation to exchange of prior information, the di¤er-
ence in expected payo¤ is
FP  EF   EP = (AF   AP )2 + 2(BN  BB)+ CN  BB
The di¤erence is a convex function in  (i.e. AF   AP > 0) , positive for 
equal to zero since CN  BB > 0 and with a negative slope in the same point
since BN   BB < 0. It can easily be veried that (AF   AP )(CN   BB) >
(BN  BB)2 so there are no real roots. Hence, we have
Proposition 6 EF > EP
Full cooperation is always preferred to sharing of prior information only.
For comparing the case of exchange of new knowledge to that of prior
knowledge only, dene
NP  EN   EP = (AN   AP )2 + (BN   2BB)+ CN  BB
where the signs can be determined as follows for the relevant range of a
and b: AN  AP > 0, BN   2BB < 0, CN  BB > 0. Hence NP is a convex
function of . However, there are no real roots of this function either and
hence NP > 0. Thus
15
Proposition 7 EN > EP
Propositions 6 and 7 demonstrate that of the cooperative arrangements,
P is the worse.
Comparison of the other cases does not lend itself so easily to analyti-
cal examination. We have therefore undertaken a numerical analysis of the
knowledge transfer strategies that we consider. In this analysis, one must
bear in mind that the strictest existence conditions for the cases under con-
sideration must always be fullled. When the di¤erence between the industry
prots under two compared regimes has a positive root, we check whether
this root is permissible to see whether there is a sign change in this di¤erence.
Let us now compare EN to EF by dening
FN  EF   EN = (AF   AN)2 +BN
where AF  AN < 0 and BN > 0 so FN is a concave function of  with
FN = 0 for  = 0 and   +FN = BN=(AF   AN) if this positive root is
within the feasible area for existence. Since FN is a concave function of 
with one positive root, we can computeFN for the largest permissible level
of . If this value is positive then we know that FN > 0 for all permissible
 up to this level; if, on the other hand, we observe that FN < 0 for
the maximum , then there must exist a critical level of aggregate prior
knowledge, below which exchange of new knowledge will be feasible and
above which it will not. If FN is negative for any feasible pair (a; b), we
know that the rms could do better by exchanging new knowledge rather
than all knowledge for this (a; b) combination.
b
.5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0
.5 + + + + + +
.6 + + + - - -
.7 + + + - - -
.8 + + - - - -
.9 + + - - - -
a
1.0 + + - - - -
Table 1. Sign of FN
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It turns out that average expected payo¤from sharing all knowledge tends
to be higher than from sharing new knowledge if initial knowledge is evenly
distributed or if competition in the product market is soft. If competition
is tough or the initial stock of knowledge is rather di¤erent, the rms are
on average better o¤ by only sharing new knowledge. This is illustrated in
Table 1 where the sign of FN for di¤erent values of (a; b) is presented. It is
interesting that limited sharing, presumably easier to implement, is dominant
for a wide set of values. We observe that competition and asymmetry are
substitutes in determining what case gives the highest expected payo¤. The
results from comparing full cooperation to exchange of new knowledge are
summed up in the proposition below.
Proposition 8 EF < EN for +FN <   min[(4a   1)=(b(1 + 4a)  
2a); 1=(2a)] where +FN   : fFN = 0 and  > 0g and EF  EN for
0 <   min[+FN ; (4a  1)=(b(1 + 4a)  2a); 1=(2a)]
Proposition 8 along with proposition 6 and 7, gives a complete ranking
of the cooperative cases in terms of average expected payo¤.
8 Comparing knowledge transfer to bench-
mark
Having ranked knowledge transfer strategies at the industry level, we pro-
ceed to compare these to the benchmark non-cooperative case. Since case
P is dominated by the other cooperative strategies, we leave this out of the
comparison. Let us rst look at full cooperation compared to expected bench-
mark payo¤ on average for the two rms. Writing the di¤erence in aggregate
average expected prots,
FB  EF   EB = (AF   AB)2 + (2BN  BB)+ CN  BB
it can easily be shown that 2BN   BB  0 with strict inequality for
a > 1=2, and that AF   AB < 0. Hence the di¤erence is decreasing and
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concave in  so FB < 0 for su¢ ciently large  if such values are consistent
with existence of equilibrium.
Again, we compute FB for the maximum  permitted and see whether
it is negative or not for di¤erent combinations of a and b. If negative, it
means that benchmark gives higher average expected payo¤ than sharing all
knowledge for the specic (a; b) and there must be a smaller critical value
for  where this no longer is true. Results for a subset of (a; b) are presented
in Table 2, where + means FB is positive; values of a less than those
indicated in the table yield FB > 0 for all values of b.
b
.5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0
.90 + + + + + +
.91 + + + + + -
.92 + + + + - -
.93 + + + - - -
.94 + + - - - -
.95 + + - - - -
.96 + - - - - -
.97 + - - - - -
.98 + - - - - -
a
.99 + - - - - -
Table 2. Sign of FB
FB is positive in most cases, but negative for certain pairs (a; b) pro-
vided a is large. Hence, rms will never go alone if competition in the product
market is soft. Furthermore, the degree of asymmetry and degree of competi-
tion are substitutes in determining whether the benchmark non-cooperative
case is preferred or not.
The results from comparing full cooperation to the benchmark are summed
up in the proposition below. The condition for preferring benchmark to coop-
eration means a has to be large if benchmark is to dominate (by implication
 has to be small in order to keep the innovation probability well dened,
but this is an artefact of the model). Intuitively, this is reasonable since the
benet from succeeding alone will be greater when a is large.
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Proposition 9 EF < EB for +FB <   a(1   a)=(b(1 + a)   a)
where +FB   : fFB = 0 and  > 0g and EF  EBfor 0 <  
min[+FB; a(1  a)=(b(1 + a)  a); 1=(2a)]
It now only remains to compare exchange of new information to bench-
mark. Dene
NB  EN   EB = (AN   AB)2 + (BN  BB)+ CN  BB
where BN BB < 0 and AN AB < 0 for all relevant (a; b). Hence, NB
is a concave function of , positively valued with a negative slope for  = 0.
Again, there will be one positive root, say +NB, so we know E
N will exceed
EB for su¢ ciently small . If the root does not violate the restrictions on
 under exchange of new knowledge and under benchmark, EB will exceed
EN for large .
We proceed by employing the same approach as before by computing
NB for the maximum  permitted and see whether it is negative or not for
di¤erent combinations of a and b. If negative, it means that benchmark gives
higher average expected payo¤ than sharing new knowledge for the specic
(a; b) and there must be a smaller critical value for  where this no longer is
true. Results for a subset of (a; b) are presented in Table 3, where + means
NB is positive.
b
.50 .51 .52 .53 .54 .55 .56 .57
.5 + + + + + + + +
.6 - - - - - + + +
.7 - - - - - - - +
.8 - - - - - - - +
a
.9 - - - - - + + +
Table 3. Sign of NB
We observe that sharing new knowledge gives higher average expected
payo¤ than benchmark in most cases, and for all b larger than those in the
table. The exception is for b close to 1=2 provided competition is not too soft
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and not too hard. A ner grid than in Table 3 reveals that for a closer to 1,
benchmark payo¤ would only be larger for b almost equal to :5. The results
are summed up as
Proposition 10 EN < EB for +NB <   min[a(1   a)=(b(1 + a)  
a); 1=a] where +NB   : fFB = 0 and  > 0g and EF  EBfor 0 <
  min[+NB; a(1  a)=(b(1 + a)  a); 1=a]
Hence, we have that benchmark payo¤ may sometimes be larger than
payo¤ from sharing new information and sometimes larger than from sharing
all information. However, the results from the simulations also show that
benchmark payo¤ is never higher than both simultaneously. Hence, going
alone cannot be a self-enforcing equilibrium when sharing new knowledge
and all knowledge both are allowed. This important result is summed up as
Proposition 11 EB < max[EN ; EF ]
9 Discussion
R&D policy goals are often made operational through specic targets for
total and private R&D expenditures. In line with the Lisbon strategy many
European countries have a target of 3 percent of GDP on total R&D spending,
2 percent private and 1 percent public. It is therefore interesting that we have




P > 2xN > 2xF
Hence, preventing or limiting cooperation would be benecial to achiev-
ing ambitious targets on R&D spending. Although specic targets for R&D
expenditures are commonly used in practical policy we should bear in mind
that this is just attempts to make underlying objectives operational. Surely,
aiming at a high level of R&D expenditures does not make sense if the prob-
ability of success and/or prots are higher with less e¤ort. We have seen that
maximum industry prot under the cooperative arrangements that give the
least R&D always exceeds the level that can be obtained when the rms do
not cooperate. If knowledge were tacit and therefore necessitated physical
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proximity to be exchanged, we expect that co-location, possibly in science
parks or incubators, would be attractive. When knowledge is not tacit so
that spillovers may take place irrespective of location, we would expect rms
to choose identical R&D approaches rather than idiosyncratic ones as in Wi-
ethaus (2005). If the policy instruments available are the aggregate level
of prior knowledge through publicly funded basic research and the distri-
bution of this between the rms (neutrality or picking winners), the Gov-
ernment may induce rms to choose exchange of new information (forming a
TSC) rather than full cooperation (through a patent pool) and the other way
around, but never to make rms go it alone. When there is some competition
in the product market, an uneven distribution of initial knowledge is su¢ -
cient to make rms limit cooperation. Exchange of prior information through
cross licensing is always dominated by the other cooperative arrangements.
The model predicts that tough product market competition and initial
asymmetry in terms of knowledge tend to lead to less cooperation and more
R&D, soft competition and initial equality to more cooperation and less
R&D. These clear-cut predictions should in principle be veriable empiri-
cally, either through use of eld data or through experiments. We consider
returning to the empirical issues in future research.
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